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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH* 
SEP2S1986 
THE STATE OF UTAHf : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. 
FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
RU L E 3 5
 Cl3rk supreme Court, Utah 
Case No. 19588 
?ntf ity % 
Appellant, through her appellate counsel, Ronald J, 
Yengich and G. Fred Metos, hereby petitions this court for 
re-hearing on the instant appeal. Said petition is based on the 
grounds and for the reason that this court has overlooked 
and/or misapprehended certain points of law and fact. 
Appellant has attached hereto, as required by Rule 
35(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a brief which 
details the basis for this petition. 
Dated this day of September, 1986. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
G. FRED METOS 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on 
this day of September, 1986. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondentf 
v. 
FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
If Ronald J. Yengich and G. Fred Metos, counsel for 
appellant, Frances Berenice Schreuder, hereby certify, pursuant 
to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the 
petition filed in the instant case is being submitted in good 
faith and not for purposes of delay. 
In addition, there is no motivation for counsel to 
delay these proceedings since appellant is and has been im-
prisoned at the Utah State Prison as a result of this conviction 
during the pendency of this appeal. 
Dated this day of September, 1986. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
G. FRED METOS 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
was mailed/delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on 
day of September, 1986. 
CERTIFICATION OF C0UNSE1 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v# 
Case Nc • 1 9 58 8 -• 
FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER, : 
D e f e n d a r i t / A p p e l l a n t • : 
POINT I 
THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED BOTH THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE AND THE LAW ON ACCOMPLICE CORRO-
BORATION, REQUIRING A REHEARING OF APPEL-
LANT'S APPEAL AND A REVERSAL OF HER CONVIC-
TION. 
This court misapprehended both the facts and law in 
addressing her point regarding the lack of c :>r r obor at ioi i of the 
accomplice testimony,, The point that appellant raised was 
whether the state had satisfied the corroboration requirement 
for the offense charged in i ' -- r >n. 
The misapprehension of the facts rf this case relates 
to two areas. First, the trial court had ruled that Richard 
Befirens was an accomplice for purposes of corroboration. (R. 
2554) That fact was disregarded in this court' •  w itten opinion 
on that issue. S e c o n d , t h i s c o u t: t f o u r i d t h a t : ; : i o ( ^  p • > * i1 e ' s 
and Miles Manning's, testimony corroborated the accomplice tes-
timony; however, that evidence does n^t relate u tilt crime 
c h a i: g e d i n t! i e 11 ;i f o r m a t i o n. 
As previously noted, the trial court hell tha* ^ehrens 
was an accomplice. (R. 2554) In reviewing Benre:;?.1 t .- -timoriy 
this court did not give any weight or acknowledgement •-o t^i,t Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
finding by the trial court. Additionally, this court misstated 
a critical portion of Behrens1 testimony, which related to his 
knowledge or intent in introducing appellant to Miles Manning. 
This court stated that Behrens introduced appellant to Miles 
Manning, but he did not know for what purpose. On direct 
examination, Behrens' stated, 
0. Did she [the appellant] ever ask you if 
you could hire or if you knew somebody who 
would kill her father? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you agree to do that? 
A. I said I would ask. I didn't know— 
Q. Did you arrange for her to meet with 
someone then? 
A. Yes, I did. 
0. Who was that? 
A. It was Miles Manning. 
(Tr. 9-20-83, 970) [Emphasis added] 
Behrens went on to state that he arranged at least "one or two" 
meetings between appellant and Manning. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 972) 
Behrens also testified that he had been requested to 
obtain a gun by both appellant and Marc Schreuder for the purpose 
of killing Franklin Bradshaw. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 973) In addi-
tion, he testified that he traveled to Virginia on several 
occasions to check out the possibility of purchasing a firearm 
there. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 974) He further testified that these 
contacts were in the fall of 1977, roughly one year before the 
death of Franklin Bradshaw. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 973) However, in 
the spring of 1978, Marc Schreuder requested Behrens to obtain Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a gun for him on several occasions. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 975) 
Behrens testified that after Franklin Bradshaw was killed, Marc 
Schreuder and appellant came to his home, where Behrens was 
given the gun used in the homicide. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 981) He 
testified that he learned of the details of the homicide from 
Marc. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 981) 
As was correctly noted in the majority opinion, the 
test for whether a person is an accomplice is whether he could 
also be charged with the offense. If a person intentionally 
aids another in the commission of an offense while acting with 
the proper mental state he may be charged with that offense, 
State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). In this case 
Behrens' actions, as described by himself, were that he made 
interstate trips to find a firearm and also introduced appellant 
to an alleged "hitman". In doing this, Behrens testified that 
he was aware of the unlawful purpose and the potential results 
of his acts. Such an awareness would certainly qualify as a 
"knowing" or "intentional" act as defined in Utah Code Annotated, 
§76-2-103 (1953 as amended). These are the mental states 
required for the offense with which the appellant was charged 
(see generally, Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-202 (1953 as amend-
ed)). Consequently, if Behrens* actions did connect appellant 
to the homicide, such actions, combined with his mental state, 
could have resulted in his being charged with the offense of 
criminal homicide, this court should re-hear and reconsider 
this appeal in light of Behrens1 status as an accomplice. 
Furthermore, this court misapprehended the law by Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
misconstruing the standard for review of accomplice testimony. 
This court stated: 
The corroboration need not go to all the 
material facts as testified to by the 
accomplice or be sufficient in itself to 
support a conviction. It must only connect 
the defendant with the commission of the 
offense and be consistent with his guilt 
and inconsistent with his innocence. 
[Emphasis added] 39 UAR 46 at 48. 
In State v. Christean, 533 P.2d 872 (Utah, 1975), this court 
stated that the following was the definitive statement on the 
standard by which courts and juries are to review the evidence 
used to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice: 
...the corroboration need not go to all the 
material facts as testified by the accom-
plice, nor need it be sufficient in itself 
to support a conviction; it may be slight 
and entitled to little consideration. How-
ever, the corroborating evidence must 
connect the defendant with the commission 
of the offense [citation omitted]; and be 
consistent with his guilt and inconsistent 
with his innocence, [citation omitted]. 
The corroborating evidence must do more 
than cast a grave suspicion on the defendant 
and it must do all of these things without 
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice. 
State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P.2d 539, 
at 541 (1953) . 
As will be shown, the testimony of Manning and Gentile 
does nothing more than cast suspicion on appellant. Richard 
Behrens was an accomplice. Thus, the court's misapplication of 
the law resulted in an erroneous outcome on the appeal. 
With respect to the corroborative evidence given by 
Vittorio Gentile, all of his testimony given regarding any 
involvement by appellant in a homicide was the following: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. Was there some discussion at that lunch 
about her father, Franklin Bradshaw? 
A. There was only one discussion after we 
finished lunch that was talked about. 
Something she mentioned, something one 
thing to put a contract on her father. 
0* Mr. Gentile, do you recall how that 
statement came about or how — 
A. No, it was just out of the blue sky. 
(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 819) 
Obviously, this did not relate to the July 23rd, 1978, 
homicide that Gentile's son, Marc Schreuder, was involved with. 
Likewise, the testimony of Miles Manning relates, at best, only 
to an uncharged and unrelated conspiracy. As this court points 
out in its majority opinion, Manning claimed to have been 
approached by appellant in the fall of 1977 about a contract 
to murder appellant's father. He was paid, but he testified that 
he did not intend to commit this offense. 
The testimony of these individuals must be considered 
in the absence of Marc Schreuder's testimony, State v. Vigil, 
supra. If this court finds that Richard Behrens' actions and 
mental state do not qualify him as an accomplice to the homicide, 
of Franklin Bradshaw, that evidence must also fail to corroborate 
Marc Schreuder's testimony. The testimony regarding the 1977 
attempts to hire Manning and have Behrens locate a firearm do 
' not connect appellant to an offense committed by her son 
nearly one year later. At best, this evidence may raise an 
inference as to motive, but such an inference does no more than 
cast a suspicion on appellant. The testimony regarding disposal 
of the murder weapon after the offense occurred may corroborate 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a charge of Obstruction of Justice.1 But such evidence does 
not corroborate any involvement on the part of appellant with 
her father's homicide. Similarly, Gentile's testimony regarding 
a "hit man" in the spring of 1978 is also unrelated to the 
actual homicide in July of 1978. 
As noted in appellant's brief, this court's prior 
rulings require that the evidence used to corroborate an 
accomplice's testimony must relate to the specific crime with 
which the defendant is charged. In State v. Clark, 3 Ut.2d 
382, 284 P.2d 700 (1959), this court held that a witness' 
testimony relating to the use of medications to induce an 
abortion does not corroborate the accomplice's testimony relating 
to a charge of performing an abortion by instrument. As 
described in this court's opinion, the testimony of Behrens, 
Manning and Gentile described unrelated, uncharged, incidents, 
not appellant's alleged inducement of Marc Schreuder to kill 
Franklin Bradshaw. 
In conclusion, the court misapplied the required 
standard of proof for corroboration of accomplice testimony. 
To find sufficient corroboration in testimony that "only con-
nects" appellant with the commission of an offense, in effect 
allows evidence that raises only a "grave suspicion" to corro-
borate the accomplice testimony. Under this court's prior 
rulings^ such evidence would not be sufficient to corroborate 
1. See Utah Code Annotated, §76-8-306 (1953 as amended). 
2. See generally, State v. Kerekes, supra; State v. Christean, 
supra; State v. Vigil, supra; and State v. Clark, supra. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the accomplice's testimony. Consequently, this court misappre-
hended a point of law by significantly lowering the standard of 
proof on that issued This court should grant the appellant a 
rehearing on this issue, reverse the judgment of the district 
court and enter an order to have appellant acquitted of the 
charge of criminal homicide. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE RELATING TO THE IMPROPER USE OF 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE BY THE STATE. 
This court misapplied the facts of the instant case 
in concluding that appellant was precluded from raising the 
issue in her appeal of the improper use of character evidence 
by the state. The grounds for this court's ruling were that 
there was not a proper objection made by trial counsel at the 
time that evidence was introduced and that the evidence was not 
unfairly prejudicial. 
Rule 103(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence pro-
vides: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, 
. and ... 
Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
3. Such retroactive judicial action lowering the quantity of 
evidence needed to convict a defendant constitutes a denial of 
appellant's Constitutional right to Due Process of Law. Bouie 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context• 
Appellant concedes that trial counsel did not specifi-
cally state that he was objecting to the questionable evidence 
on the basis of the improper use of character evidence. However, 
this court needs to review the objection that was made and do 
so in the context of the prior motion and previous objection 
made by counsel. If that is done one can see that it is obvious 
that the grounds for the objection are apparent from the con-
text and the circumstances in which it was made. Initially, 
counsel made an objection based on the improper use of hearsay 
testimony. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 928) Dr. Moench then described 
part of the Schreuder's family history as related by Marc. 
When Dr. Moench began to describe a specific instance of conduct 
relating to appellant's character (specifically a suicide at-
tempt), another objection was made by counsel. (Tr. 9-20-83, 
p. 929) The relevant portion of that testimony was as follows: 
0. [by Mr. Jones] And Dr. Moench, do you 
recall what Marc Schreuder told you concern-
ing his family and his history? 
A. Yes, I recall a great deal about it. 
Q. What did he tell you about the back-
ground? 
Mr. Rosen: I will object, Judge. Now 
I will object. 
The Court: I will let him — he is 
talking only family history. Nothing in 
relation to the matter that Marc is charged 
with before, Dr. Moench. We are not asking 
that at this time. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Witness: Yesf sir. 
The Court: You can answer. 
The Witness: Marc told me about his 
family background. He apparently lived in 
New York. His parents were divorced when 
he was approximately three years of age, as 
I recall. He lived with his mother. He 
had an older brother named Larry or Lawrence, 
I guess, and a younger sister later on 
named Lavinia. 
He described his living with a stepfather 
and the family. As I recall, the name 
Frederick and the family moving to Europe, 
spending time in Brussells and Holland and 
Marc changing school, as I recall, for 
different times while he was living in 
Brussels or Belgium, excuse me, and then 
returning. He told about the family pro-
blems between his mother and Frederick, his 
brother and Frederick living in Europe 
another year. Repeated quarrels between 
his mother and Frederick over the phone 
during that time, of Frederick and Larry 
returning and a great deal of strife going 
on. 
Frederick locking Marc's mother and Marc 
out of the house. The mother locking 
Frederick out of the house. Apparently a 
great deal of turmoil during that time. He 
told me about his brother being charged 
with attempted murder of a roommate by 
hitting him with a hammer, and, as I recall, 
the brother was found not guilty by reason 
of insanity and was due for a discharge 
from another mental hospital at the time I 
was interviewing Marc. Marc told about his 
relationships to Gramps and his Grandma 
and told about his mother, describing the 
relationships she had with him. 
He told about the disturbances in the 
family. If things didn't go exactly as his 
mother wanted, including threats of suicide 
Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, please, I am 
going to move to object and strike. I just 
think it is going much further beyond what 
Your Honor allowed. [Emphasis added] Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court: I will let him relate the 
history he obtained as to the background of 
the boy and his family relationships. 
The Witness: May I continue? 
The Court: Yes, you may continue on, 
sir. 
The Witness: He told about attempting 
to persuade his mother not to commit suicide. 
Apparently a very traumatic scene lasting 
some half hour or so and told of his mother 
taking an overdose of medication, and Marc, 
as I recall, the age of 14 or 15 had to 
summon the paramedics and have his mother 
taken to the hospital. He told about his 
mother locking Larry out of — if Larry 
didn't do everything she wanted, he told 
about him being locked out of the apartment 
and having no place to go except to spend 
the night in the stairwell. He told of his 
mother continuing to always be dissatisfied 
and wanting to move to more elaborate 
quarters. He described his relationship to 
his mother after her time she spent with 
the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist had 
moved to Canada, and Marc had to virtually 
take the place of a psychiatrist listening 
to the mother's problems. He told about 
not being permitted to have any other 
friends and said that his mother was his 
only friend. If he attempted to make 
friends, she would always tell him this is 
a bad boy you are spending time with and 
not allowing him to have friends, so he 
simply didn't have friends. He told me 
about coming to Utah, as I recall, in 1977, 
and the purpose of this was — 
The Court: Just a moment, I think here 
— do you know what the answer is, Mr. 
Jones? 
Mr. Jones: I am not sure, Your Honor. 
The Court: What I don't want, I think 
you can tell us, Doctor, about the relation-
ship with Marc and his mother, not what she 
may have said to him or done or nothing in 
relation to — 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mr* Jones: I understand* 
The Court: You understand* 
Mr* Jones: Let me ask this question* 
Was there anything else Marc would have 
told you concerning his relationship with 
his mother? 
A: Yes, I think significantly if he didn't 
do everything to please her, she would 
threaten to lock him out, threaten to disown 
him and repeatedly told him that they would 
be disowned, that they would be thrown out 
of their apartment, that they would wind up 
in Harlem living in the gutter. That she 
and Lavinia would starve if Marc didn't do 
everything she said to* (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 
928-931) 
From this testimony, it can be seen that there were 
two distinct objections made* The first was to the hearsay 
issue* (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 928) Dr. Moench was allowed to describe 
Marc Schreuder's personal and family history as related to him 
by Marc. (Tr. 9-20-83, p. 930) When Dr. Moench began to 
describe appellant's character as related by Marc Schreuder a 
second strenuous objection on different grounds was made. (Tr. 
9-20-83, p. 930) It is unquestionable from the context that 
counsel was objecting to references about appellant's character, 
specifically to a reference to a suicide attempt. 
Even if this court is able to find that such an 
objection was insufficient the nature of the testimony itself 
should have required its review under Rule 103(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. That Rule provides: 
Nothing in ths rule precludes taking notice 
of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court* 
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The testimony in question allowed the jury hear 
unsubstantiated and uncorroborated allegations that appellant 
was suicidal, overbearing/ overprotective and suffering from 
some sort of mental illness. Dr. Moench was also allowed to 
describe similar uncorroborated and unsubstantiated threats by 
appellant relating to abandonment of her children and psycholo-
gical , physical and emotional abuse of those children. These 
allegations came from a recognized medical expert in the field 
of psychiatry. The substance of this testimony had never been 
raised by appellant. Nor were these facts described by any of 
the other witnesses, including Marc Schreuder.4 The obvious 
effect of this testimony was to create an impression from a 
medical expert that appellant was a person who is both psycho-
logically deranged and a danger to herself, her children and 
others. 
There can be no question that allowing the jury to 
hear evidence of this nature affected the substantial rights of 
appellant. The probative value of such evidence was minimal 
when weighed against its prejudicial effect, Rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence.5 in disregarding both the objection 
that was made and the substance of the testimony given by Dr. 
Moench this court misapprehended the facts of this case. This 
court should reconsider and rehear appellant's appeal, reverse 
4. The impropriety in the use of this testimony was discussed 
in Point III A of appellant's brief which is attached as "Appen-
dix A". 
5. See Point III B of the Brief of Appellant, attached as 
"Appendix Bw. 
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her conviction and order a new trial • 
POINT III 
THIS COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW RELATING TO 
THE ISSUE OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A PATIENT'S 
DECLARATIONS TO A PHYSICIAN MADE FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF HAVING THE PHYSICIAN TESTIFY AT 
TRIAL. 
Appellant submits that the majority opinion misappre-
hended the law regarding Rule 803(4) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. That rule provides: 
The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness:..• 
Statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment and describing 
medical history, or past or present symp-
toms, pain, or sensations, or the inception 
or general character of the cause or external 
source thereof insofar as reasonably perti-
nent to diagnosis or treatment. 
This rule follows the same federal rule of evidence which 
abolished the distinction between statements made to a physician 
for treatment and statements made to a physician for purposes 
of testifying at trial. In allowing a physician to repeat the 
patient's statements, this court specifically relied on the 
holding in the case of United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 
(8th Cir., 1980) . 
In Iron Shell, the Court of Appeals required that the 
courts engage in a two tier analysis before such declarations 
could be admissible. That analysis requires that the trial court 
determine first, whether the declarant's motive was consistent 
with the rule of evidence; and second, whether the physician's 
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"reliance on those declarations was reasonable.6 This court's 
majority opinion did not attempt to undertake such an analysis 
of this type of testimony. Rather this court relied solely 
upon Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and allowed the 
witness to make that determination of reliability himself. As 
the dissent in the instant case points out, this court's majority 
opinion serves as an expansive loophole for the use of highly 
unreliable evidence. Other courts have eliminated this loophole 
by engaging in the analysis described above. 
Again, the dissenting opinion in this case does find 
that the evidence in question was merely cumulative. That 
issue was addressed in Point III A of Appellant's Reply Brief.7 
As was described in that brief, Dr. Moench went well beyond 
any other evidence presented at trial regarding appellant's 
character and Marc Shchreuder's background. 
This court misapplied the law on the issue of the 
admissibility of declarations made to a physician for preparation 
for testimony at trial. The court's decision on this issue 
should be re-heard and appellant's conviction should be reversed 
and a new trial ordered. 
6. This analysis was undertaken on Point III C of Appellant's 
Brief which is attached as "Appendix C". 
?• See Appendix D. 
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POINT IV 
THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS RELATING 
TO THE ELEMENT OF INTENT IN THE OFFENSE OF 
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. 
This court misapprehended the facts relating to the 
issue of appellant's intent. In ruling that the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the conviction for Murder in the First 
Degree, this court stated that the evidence indicated that 
appellant believed that she would receive an inheritance if her 
father died. The only evidence introduced with respect to the 
will indicated that appellant's mother would inherit or control 
the entire estate. (R. 808) The only evidence regarding the 
appellant's belief as to her father's intentions was the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. (Tr. 725, 732) 
This element and evidence was the only difference between first 
and second degree murder. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 338 (Ut. 
1977). 
Such evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict. 
This court should reconsider its finding on this issue. The 
appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded 
to the District Court with an order to reduce the degree of 
offense from first to second degree murder. 
CONCLUSION 
This court misapprehended the facts and the law relat-
ing to the appeal in this case. The issues raised above should 
be reheard and reconsidered. The appellant's conviction should 
be reversed and this court should order either a new trial or 
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the entry of a judgment of acquittal. 
Dated this day of September, 1986 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
G. FRED METOS 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on 
this day of September, 1986. 
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A 
THE TESTIMONY OF DR. MOENCH IMPROPERLY PLACED 
INTO EVIDENCE THE CHARACTER OF THE APPELLANT 
AND THUS DENIED HER DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Dr. Moench's opinion, which was based substantially 
on hearsay, was simply a device for improperly placing character 
evidence before the jury. The statements clearly put appellant's 
character into issue, without her first raising the issue by 
introducing character evidence.10 Rule 404, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, (1983), provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence 
of a person's character or a trait of his 
character is not admissible for the purpose 
of proving that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of his character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same; [Emphasis supplied] H ~ 
10. In fact character or reputation evidence as to appellant was 
never offered at trial. See Gramham, West's Handbook of Federal 
Evidence, (1981) §404.3 at 198: 
In criminal cases, Rule 404(a)(1) 
provides that the prosecution may not in 
the first instance introduce evidence of a 
pertinent character trait of the accused as 
part of the case in chief against him. By 
longstanding tradition the unfair prejudice 
to the defendant in being portrayed as a 
"bad man" is felt to substantially outweigh 
any probative value the evidence might possess. 
11. This rule is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 404 
and conforms to former Utah Rule of Evidence 47(b) which provided 
in pertinent part: 
[I]n a criminal action evidence of a trait 
of an accused's character as tending to 
prove his guilt or innocence of the offense 
charged . . ., (ii) if offered by the 
prosecution to prove his guilt, may be 
admitted only after the accused has introduced 
evidence of his good character. 
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Dr. Moench testified as to the conversations he had 
with Marc Schreuder. This testimony, in effect, served to prove 
that appellant had a bad character in that she was an overbearing, 
cruel and dominating mother, and controlled her son Marc through 
various devices which included threatening suicide and locking 
Marc and his brother out of their home. Dr. Moench was allowed 
to go so far as to voice an opinion about an Oedipus complex 
between son and mother, and that Marc showed no signs of inde-
pendent thinking. In addition, Dr. Moench made reference to 
hearing a tape of Mrs. Schreuder and her daughter, Lavinia.12 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the 
prosecution may not introduce evidence of an accused's character 
unless the accused himself raises the issue." State v. Urias, 
609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980). See also Boyce, "Character Evidence; 
The Substantive Use," Utah Bar Journal (Summer-Fall 1976) at 
21-22. There, Professor Boyce states, "Until the accused 
offers evidence of his own good character, the prosecution may 
not offer evidence of an accused's bad character." 
Three cases from this court have demonstrated this 
court's intent to limit evidence presented at trial to that 
which avoids general allegations of prior misconduct tending 
to show that the accused is such an evil person that he or she 
likely is guilty of the offense charged. In State v. Dickson, 
361 P.2d 412 (Utah 1961), State v. Kazda, 382 P.2d 407 (Utah 
1963) and State v. Peterson, 457 P.2d 532 (Utah 1969), this 
12. This tape was ruled inadmissible by the trial court at the 
sentencing hearing. (Tr. 935) 
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court reversed convictions where wide ranging cross-examination 
by prosecutors produced evidence of other unproven wrongdoings 
from the accused on the witness stand,13 The evidence of prior 
misconduct introduced through Dr. Moench's opinion is the type 
that concerned the court in Dickson: 
The very purpose of excluding such evidence 
is to prevent the prosecution from smearing 
an accused by showing a bad reputation and 
relying on that for conviction rather than 
being required to produce adequate proof of 
the crime in question. . . 
. . . It is the sound and salutary policy 
of the law to indulge everyonef including 
convicted felons, with the presumption of 
innocence, and to require the state to 
obtain and present sufficient credible 
evidence to convince the jury of the 
defendant's guilt of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. (361 P.2d at 
414) 
0rf as worded differently, but nonetheless effectively: 
. . . The universally accepted general rule 
is that such evidence is not admissible if 
its effect is merely to disgrace the 
defendant or show his propensity to commit 
crime. (361 P.2d at 415) 
Here, the defense never offered any evidence of 
appellant's good character. Therefore, it was erroneous and 
prejudicial to the point of denying appellant her due process of 
< 
13. In Kazda, the defendant was charged with assault with 
intent to commit murder. An F.B.I, agent testified about 
his questioning the accused about other unproven crimes includ-
ing murder. In Dickson, the accused charged with robbery was 
questioned concerning an unrelated incident in Texas where both 
he and his brother received gunshot wounds. In Peterson, the * 
defendant was charged with distribution of L.S.D. The court 
found a prosecutor's questions about his use of other narcotics 
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law for Dr. Moench's testimony to be admitted.14 Thus, the 
conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.15 
14, Fourteenth Amendment, Constitution of the United States; 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of the State of Utah. 
15. This court has similarly held that when the character of the 
accused is put into question by the defense the prosecution 
may, on rebuttal, offer evidence from third persons, but, that 
testimony must be limited to reputation or opinion and may not 
relate to specific instances. State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 
148 P. 1971 (1915). 
In Anselmo, the court states at p. 1616, 
"It is settled law that evidence of good 
character, or evidence to the contrary, 
must be confined to general reputation of 
the person, or the general reputation of 
the particular trait in issue". 
In the case at bar, Dr. Moench testified that appellant allegedly 
committed various specific acts against Marc Schreuder which 
were not a result of the defendant previously offering evidence 
of good character^ 
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B 
BECAUSE ANY PROBATIVE VALUE IN DR. MOENCH'S 
TESTIMONY WAS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY 
THE INSURMOUNTABLE PREJUDICE, ITS EXCLUSION 
WAS REQUIRED BY RULE 403 , UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
The recently adopted Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence provides that: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.16 
The case law holds that the determination of relevance 
is a two step test in which the trial judge must first determine 
16. This rule is substantially the same as former Utah Rules of 
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whether the evidence is relevant to some issue at trial other 
than that the defendant is a bad person, and second, whether 
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of undue prejudice. "Only when both of these tests have been 
affirmatively satisfied is the evidence properly admitted." 
United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1978) 
cert, den. 439 U.S. 868, 58 L.Ed.2d 179, 99 S.Ct. 196 (1978). 
If the trial judge "has carefully made the requisite 
analysis, the exercise of his broad discretion will not be 
lightly overturned." See State v. John, 615 P.2d 1263, 1264 
(Utah 1980), United States v. Williams, supra, at 577 F.2d 191. 
However, where, as here, the trial judge has passed over this 
analysis in arriving at his decision, his discretion has been 
abused, or never exercised at all. Cf., United States v. 
Alvarez, supra, at 584 F.2d 701. Had the trial court balanced 
this evidence as required by the rules, he would have concluded 
that the evidence was highly inflammatory, both inherently, and 
in the context of this case. See State v. John, supra at 
1264. 
Evidence of prior wrong doing is inherently prejudicial 
in that it tends to persuade the jury that the defendant is a 
bad person, and that he or she has a propensity to commit 
crimes. Such prejudices are acutely dangerous because they 
distort the determination of guilt or innocence, and because 
jurors are particularly responsive to their influence. Author-
ities agree that this type of evidence is usually dispositive 
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of the underlying issue in most cases.!7 In this context. 
Judge Weinstein, in his treatise on evidence, speaks unequivo-
cally: 
If the trial judge concludes that the 
reliability of the inculpatory statement is 
outweighed by the possibility of prejudice— 
which he will almost always do—he should 
exclude it. Because of the dangers involved, 
exclusion should almost always result when 
a statement against penal interest is 
offered against the accused. (Citation 
omitted, emphasis in original.) 4 WEINSTEIN, 
On Evidence 804-113. 
The prejudice to appellant in the context of this case 
is obvious. As the trial court stated at one point in the the 
proceedings (Tr. 75-76): 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Jones: 
Actually, the factual matter as to what the 
police reports have as to the shooting of Mr. 
Bradshaw are not a big issue. What I am 
saying, there are no — it's not the major 
part of the case. I would imagine one day 
you are going to get all of that part of the 
case in. 
MR. JONES: Hopefully, yes. 
THE COURT: Well, you know, there is nobody 
going to dispute the fundamental basis in 
view of the one conviction. Nobody is going 
to make a big issue over cause, I would 
presume, or hope nobody is going to require 
any extensive medical testimony whatsoever 
concerning the cause of death and this, that 
and the other. Those matters, they are not 
the issues, really, and I am sure you can do 
those in a day. 
MR. JONES: That's correct. 
17. Controlled studies of jury behavior and decision-making have 
confirmed that admission of evidence of other crimes may double 
the chances of conviction where there are contradictions in the 
government's case. See, e.g. H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The 
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THE COURT: The issues become on these other 
matters of — and I use just in a broad 
phrase, so-called direction or duress. Those 
are the big issues, aren't they? 
MR. JONES: They are. 
THE COURT: And the gentleman whose problems 
just thinking out loud. These matters in New 
York, as I say, that portion of the item, of 
the issue, seems to hinge substantially upon 
the credibility issue. Where does the truth 
lie as to why? 
MR. JONES: Well, I have no question — 
THE COURT: Not how, but why. Does that 
fairly well state the issue? 
MR. JONES: I think it does, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I don't think anybody is going to 
raise a lot of fuss about how. 
MR. JONES: But I guess my position — 
THE COURT: That's the reason I am concerned 
about the question I had and it's in my mind, 
I will speak out loud, the necessity of the 
information in the State of New York is what 
gives me the problem. 
Although the Court, in this exchange with the prosecu-
tor, did show some concern over the issue of other bad acts, it 
nevertheless allowed the evidence to come in at trial. As 
previously argued, the probative value of the evidence was 
minimal while at the same time, the prejudicial effect was 
devastating. Therefore, it was prejudicial error to admit the 
evidence and appellant's conviction should be reversed and a 
new trial ordered. 
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< 
MARC SCHREUDER'S STATEMENTS TO DR. MOENCH 
CONSTITUTED INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY AND SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED. 
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Although both the present and former Rules of Evidence 
allow statements made to a physician for purposes of diagnosis 
or treatment to be admissible as exceptions to the hearsay 
rule,I8 courts have required a strong showing of reliability 
before admitting statements made solely to obtain an expert's 
opinion for litigation. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 
77 (8th Cir. 1980)r dealt with a similar issue in the context 
of a child witness who was alleged to be the victim of a sexual 
assault. The court allowed the doctor who treated the child to 
testify about her statements regarding the assault. The court 
noted that there was a strong indicia of reliability in that 
the girl's description was made for the purpose of medical 
treatment and it was given shortly after the incident occurred. 
The court also specifically stated that had the statement been 
given to an expert solely for the purpose of obtaining an 
expert's opinion for trial then it may not have been admissible. 
It then enunciated a two tier analysis to be used in determining 
the admissibility of such statements. Firstr the trial court 
must determine if the declarant's motive for making the state-
ment is consistent with the rule. Secondly, the trial court 
must decide if it was reasonable for a physician to rely on the 
information in performing his diagnosis or treatment. 
In the instant case, Dr. Moench was originally called 
upon to provide a diagnosis of Marc Schreuder's mental state as 
18. See Utah Rules of Evidence 803(4) and the former Utah 
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evidence in defense of his own case. (Tr. 927) Marc's defense 
was that he was under extreme mental and emotional pressure 
from appellant, who convinced him to commit the homicide. (Tr. 
848) Appellant submits that Marc's motive to falsify in such a 
situation was substantial. Not only was there a strong possi-
bility that he was attempting to avoid a criminal conviction by 
shifting the blame to his mother, but it is also probable that 
he was attempting to save his own life, in that he was charged 
with a captial offense. Consequently, the evidence here fails 
to pass the first tier of the Iron Shell test. The hearsay 
statements also fail the second tier of analysis, the reason-
ableness of the physician's reliance on the evidence. Here, 
the only meetings Dr. Moench had with Marc consisted of two -
two hour interviews. (Tr. 927) The statements made had previ-
ously never been revealed. Nor was there any attempt made to 
substantiate the statements through any other relatives or 
close friends. Finally, the statements were made several years 
after the homicide. Consequently, the statements made by Marc 
were inadmissible hearsay. 
In addition, appellant's trial counsel was not able 
to effectively cross examine Marc on the statements, thus 
denying appellant her right to confrontation as guaranteed by 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section IV of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. Although Marc had been called to testify at 
trial, he was not cross-examined about these statements. The 
reason for that is obvious, the trial court had previously 
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ruled that Marc's statements to Dr. Moench were inadmissible. 
(Tr. 45) Marc was called to testify prior to Dr. Moench, thus 
precluding cross-examination on these statements. 
The situation here is analogous to those cases where 
a witness is called and refuses to answer, thus allowing the 
prosecution to introduce a prior statement by that witness into 
evidence. In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) and State 
v. Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1975) the United States Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Court of Utah both respectively held that 
such a situation denies a criminal defendant his constitutional 
right to confrontation. In both of these situations the witness 
is able to avoid a face to face confrontation with the defendant 
and the jury so that his demeanor and credibility are not 
weighed. Douglas v. Alabamay supra. 
When an appellant's right to confrontation has been 
denied, unless it can be demonstrated that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction must be reversed. 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The extreme pre-
judicial nature of this evidence has previously been discussed 
and need not be repeated. Suffice it to say that the number 
and nature of the wbad acts" described by Dr. Moench could not 
possibly have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant 
respectfully submits that the conviction rendered below must be 
reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for a new 
trial. 
39 
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POINT III 
A 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY ALLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT. 
At trial, the court allowed Dr. Louis Moench to de-
scribe the relationship between Marc Schreuder and appellant as 
it had been related to him by Marc Schreuder. One of the 
effects of this testimony was to allow evidence of bad character, 
in violation of Rule 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Respondent argues that there was no specific objection on the 
basis of character evidence made to this testimony. Secondly, 
respondent argues that such evidence was merely cumulative. 
Respondent relies on Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence in claiming there must be a statement of the specific 
grounds for objection to claim error on appeal. However, under 
that rule, it is sufficient if the grounds for the objection were 
apparent from the context in which they were made. In this 
case an objection was made to testimony about appellant's 
threat of suicide. (R. 1947) From this context, it is obvious 
that in addition to the hearsay guestion, this objection was 
made to evidence of character or bad acts of appellant. Like-
wise, more general objections were made regarding the content 
of the statements related to Dr. Moench by Marc Schreuder. (R. 
1946, 1951) 
Respondent also argues that appellant's rights were not 
substantially affected by Dr. Moench's testimony because it was 
merely cumulative. The majority of Dr. Moench's testimony is 
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set out in appellant's brief. In essence, Moench describes 
a situation where Marc Schreuder and his brother, Larry, were 
continually being locked out of appellant's apartment, requiring 
them to sleep in stairwells. She would not allow him to have 
friends, would threaten to disown him, would threaten to move 
to Harlem, or live in the gutter. Dr. Moench also described 
how appellant had been seeing a psychiatrist and how, when he 
moved, Marc Schreuder took the psychiatrist's place in counsel-
ing appellant. (R. 1947-1951) 
When Marc Schreuder testified he did not mention the 
majority of the information described to Dr. Moench. With 
respect to being locked out of the home he described one incident 
that he remembered when he was 13 or 14 years old. (R. 1823) 
He also described one incident where his mother struck him. 
Further, he stated that she put pressure on him and "harped" at 
him all of the time. (R. 1823) None of the other incidents 
described by Dr. Moench were related in court by Marc Schreuder. 
Other evidence cited by respondent as making Dr. 
Moench's testimony cummulative included Richard Behrens1 state-
ments: "appellant would get upset but it would blow over", 
(R. 1987), she got angry and went into a rage when he demanded 
money from her (R. 2009), finally, he was aware that appellant 
had locked Marc Schreuder out on occasion but he did not know 
of any incident where Marc was locked out for a week at a time. 
(R. 2109) Vittorio Gentile testified that he would have to 
strike or beat appellant on occasion, and that was to bring her 
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out of hysterical convulsions* (R. 1850) Marilyn Reaganf 
appellant's sister, stated there would be times that appellant 
would become hysterical and loose control. (R. 2407) This 
was answered in conjunction with questions about appellant's 
marital problems resulting from physical abuse by Vittorio 
Gentile* With these witnesses, including Marc Schreuderf the 
statements regarding appellant's character arose from isolated 
questions with each witness. Never was a long involved discus-
sion of appellant's character described by Dr. Moench. The 
effect on the jury from those witnesses could not have near the 
impact that Dr. Moench's testimony had. 
As for the testimony of Steven Kleinf that was given 
over objection by defense counsel. (R. 2437, 2440) That 
evidence did not relate to appellant's relationship with Marc 
Schreuder. Similar to the testimony just described, the effect 
of Klein's testimony was insignificant in relation to Dr. 
Moench's. 
In conclusion, the nature of the evidence from wit-
nesses other than Dr. Moench relating to appellant's character 
was not cumulative. Essentially, the other witnesses described 
appellant's temper. They did not describe the specific incidents 
as related by Dr. Moench. Nor was the majority of the testimony 
given by these witnesses focused on appellant's character. 
Consequently, the error committed at trial in admitting the 
testimony of Dr. Moench regarding the character of appellant 
was prejudicial, requiring reversal of the judgment and convic-
tion. 
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